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Zheng Zhou, The sculpture “Non-Violence” by Carl Fredrik Reuterswärd, in front of UN 
headquarters at New York City, 13 January 2012 (licensed under the GNU Free Documentation 
License). 
 
1. Introduction 
Created in 1985 by Swedish artist Carl Fredrik Reuterswärd, the renown 
sculpture “non-violence” – an oversized Colt Python .357 magnum revolver with 
knotted barrel – was initially thought to encapsulate John Lennon’s call1 for a socio-
cultural shift to peace and non-violence by playing around the object, its iconogra-
phy and the unrealistic shape given to it. Undoubtedly, the sculpture quickly became 
an icon, juxtaposed to other illustrious violence-related artworks such as Picasso’s 
Guernica or John Heartfield’s 1933 “The Old Motto in the “New” Reich: Blood 
and Iron”. Unveiled in front of the United Nations building in New York some 
three years later in 1988, the pistol has since been erected in more than 30 locations 
around the world with its pointed-up muzzle spreading the message from the centre 
1 The sculpture was initially thought of as a tribute to John Lennon after his death in New York City 
on December the 8th 1980. 
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of various political projects (Chaoyang Park, Beijing; U.N. Headquarters, New 
York; Chennai, India; Kirchberg Plateau, Luxembourg, just to mention a few).  
While the knotted gun deconstructs (physically and ideally) the meaning of 
the weapon and shoots in front of bystanders a limpid message, it could have not 
been better designed to also draw a problematic veil over a particularly spinous 
problem: the relations between weapons (technologies, objects) and violence. 
Nested in the sculpture, behind more apparent and immediate meanings, lies a dou-
ble reference to what Deleuze defined as direct violence of coercion and indirect 
violence of control (Buchanan 2017). In addition, and connection to this, “non-
violence” poses also a question pertaining the relations between ob-
jects/technologies per se (the arms), practices and processes revolving around 
weapons and broader socio-political relations (violence, armed conflict as a conjuga-
tion of the latter, authority and power). 
The sculpture’s shape, through the knotted barrel, conveys the idea that 
the weapon is a tool. The presence of this instrument (if unknotted) is deemed to 
affect the pathologies of society, amongst which is violence (I am purposefully ex-
aggerating). Its materiality is granted prominence – the original version is repro-
duced in disproportionate dimensions somehow stressing the relevance of quanti-
ties and qualities of the object. Its functioning mechanisms, its technology in a 
sense, is considered relevant and the knot on the muzzle simultaneously acknowl-
edges that the weapon is both “just an object” and “more than just an object”, thus 
depicting a sort of curse of arms proliferation: magical attributes are endowed to the 
gun that triggers violence. At the same time the artwork also suggests that there is, 
or at least there might be, somebody at the rear of the weapon and somebody ahead 
knotting it, both of them with their agency and intentionality. The revolver holds an 
intrinsically relational character: it enshrines a centre and a periphery, for when it is 
unknotted the centre lies around the triggering mechanism, and when it is being 
knotted centre and periphery change. In this sense the relations between ob-
jects/weapons and violence could be understood as a matter of intentions and con-
sequent actions for which the tools are irrelevant. Amidst the winding knots of 
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these seemingly circular readings one smells the contiguities and limits of two main 
frameworks that according to Bourne have bridled western political thought in its 
understanding of weapons-violence relations (2012): substantivist views asserting the 
autonomy of weapons as objects that determine socio-political relations; instrumental-
ist perspectives understanding weapons as neutral tools shaped into violence as de-
termined by agents and their intentions. 
This paper deals with the relations between weapons and insurgency, as a 
particular form of violence. Specifically, it explores how availability and control of 
small arms by non-state armed actors impact on authority in insurgencies2. By fo-
cusing on practices and processes, it traces arms dynamics and authority dynamics 
and argues that the former shall be understood in mutual relation with the constitu-
tion and distributions of the latter. The paper tries to avoid deterministic ap-
proaches and conceives the linkages between arms and authority, not in terms of 
linear causality, but through a more interpretative sense of understanding (Cho-
jnacki and Engels 2016). In order to overcome the deterministic and dualistic ap-
proach of both substantive and instrumentalist blocks, it follows Bourne’s Latou-
rian conception of materiality as a dimension of social and political life (Bourne 
2012). In other words, material aspects (and material relations) are conceived as di-
mensions of the constitution, character and distribution of socio-political relations 
since the two mutually constitute each other. 
This schism has characterized also civil war studies, where a systematic 
analysis of the impact that availability and control over weapons and related proc-
esses - as physical/material as well as social aspects of conflicts - have on armed 
2 The enquiry is focused on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as the most significant category 
of weapons in possession of non-state armed actors. The text adopts the definition of SALW put 
forward by the Small Arms Survey on the base of  the 1997 U.N. Panel of Governmental Experts on 
Small Arms. See the Small Arms Survey’s definition of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html; Report of the Panel of 
Governmental Experts on Small Arms, Annex, General Assembly Resolution A/52/298, para. 16, 
25, 27, 27 August 1997, http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html#b6.  
The term “small arms” is used in the text to refer to SALW, their ammunition, parts and accessories 
while “light weapons” refers exclusively to this category. The term “firearms” is employed in the text 
as a synonym of SALW. 
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groups and their socio-political action and practices is still missing. Thus, the aim of 
this paper is two-fold, theoretical and empirical. First, the article attempts to con-
ceptually systematize the interrelations between arms and insurgency by intertwining 
recent shifts in the literature on civil war with research on firearms and armed vio-
lence. In doing so it contributes a novel heuristic framework for understanding 
small arms-insurgency relations that revolves around a conceptualization of arms as 
“meta-resources”. 
Second, the empirical part focuses on one specific aspect of these relations 
and explores the linkages between armed groups’ mode of weapons acquisition and 
authority in insurgency applying the analytical framework proposed in part I to two 
case studies: Myanmar and Ukraine. These two contexts, for different reasons and 
with different characteristics, have been deemed as major areas of firearms prolif-
eration (see Bourne 2007; Duquet ed. 2018), while also being characterized by hy-
brid orders of authority and governance. Doing so, this part contributes to previous 
works looking into this specific matter (Marsh 2007; Duquet 2009; Mkutu 2009; 
Strazzari & Tholens 2010, 2014). In addition, it illustrates how practices and proc-
esses of arms acquisition have dialectically emerged with different patterns of au-
thority in the insurgencies analysed in Ukraine and Myanmar and suggests that this 
has possibly impacted on governance arrangements. 
Part II is based on a systematic analysis of primary and secondary sources 
on firearms proliferation3. Concerning Myanmar, the paper draws also on informal 
3 Data sourced from primary and secondary sources have been structured into two different datasets 
for qualitative analysis. The Ukraine dataset is primarily based on data retrieved from official press 
releases on firearms seizures issued by the Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny (SBU – the Security Services of 
Ukraine) and the Derzhavna Prykordonna Sluzhba Ukrayiny (DPSU – State Border Guard Service of 
Ukraine). In addition, it also comprises news sourced from the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms 
Transfers (NISAT) database on small arms run by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). This 
dataset consists of 514 cases of official and non-official press releases concerning weapons covering 
the period 2014-2017. Data for the Myanmar dataset instead were sourced exclusively from the NI-
SAT/PRIO database and resulted in 114 news articles distributed throughout the period 1994-2017. 
The author is grateful to Dr. Ekaterina Golovko, who contributed to create the dataset on Ukraine 
as part of the broader EU-funded SAFTE Project (Studying the Acquisition of illicit Firearms by 
Terrorist in Europe). The main delivery of the project consisted in the edited book “Triggering Ter-
ror. Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe”, available here: 
www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/safte/publications (Duquet 2018). The author wishes to thank also 
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conversations, unstructured and semi-structured interviews carried out through 
fieldwork in Thailand and Myanmar in September-October 2018.4 Due to evident 
caveats connected to the very nature of arms dynamics in conflict-complexes, the 
flaws of secondary sources, the discrepancies in data considered and methods used 
for the two cases, a comprehensive study of the interplay between mode of weap-
ons acquisition by non-state armed actors and insurgency in Ukraine and Myanmar 
is outside the scope of this paper. Thus, Part II constitutes an exploration aimed to 
generate insights by drawing from available sources rather than a full-fledged com-
parison. 
As the question of the role of arms in insurgencies should be situated in 
the literature on civil war and armed groups, I first turn to the latter to try and de-
lineate the broader canvas of the paper. Second, drawing from the body of work on 
arms dynamics in conflict (Marsh 2012), the article strives to frame the links be-
tween firearms and insurgency. Lastly, in the empirical part, the case studies from 
armed conflicts in Myanmar and Ukraine are presented and analysed. 
 
Part I | A Systematization of the Relations between Arms and Insurgency 
 
2. From Civil War to the Meso-levels of Insurgency and Armed Politics 
By the end of the 1990s, the relative importance of civil wars had fostered 
the field of peace and conflict studies to inquire into definitional and explanatory 
questions pertaining this type of armed conflicts (David 1997; Sambanis 2000). At 
initial stages, the interest rested mainly on structural and proximate aspects of civil 
wars.5 While both macro and micro-level theories of the causes of war found space 
Dr. Nicholas Marsh, Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) for granting ac-
cess and support in navigating NISAT database. 
4 The author would like to acknowledge the financial support received by Sant’Anna School of 
advanced studies in conducting this research. 
5 In particular frequency and intensity (Collier & Hoeffler 1998), the economic causes of civil war 
(Collier 2000; Sambanis 2004a), pre-conditions for the onset (Fearon  et al. 2004), duration (Hegre 
2004), civil war outcomes (Licklider 1995, De Rouen et al. 2004), and peacemaking negotiations 
(Darby 2001). 
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during the 2000s6, the contradictory nature of the causal mechanisms proposed 
compelled scholars to explore new research areas. In turn, although the field started 
devoting more attention to the heterogeneity of armed groups, their structures, and 
behaviour (Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 2007), an appreciation of the socio-political as-
pects of intrastate conflict was still missing. Since the end of the decade, three 
strands of the literature have tried to tackle these gaps: the literature on insurgency 
fragmentation (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012), rebel governance (Arjona, Kasfir 
and Mampilly 2015), and armed political orders (Staniland 2017).7  
These three strands have raised broader issues in the field, questioning 
some of the axioms underpinning previous research. Monolithic or dyadic under-
standings of conflict actors have been abandoned to emphasise instead their hetero-
geneity and complex articulation. As a corollary to this multiplicity and heterogene-
ity, a more nuanced interpretation of civil war has been advanced. The alleged mo-
nopoly of the state over the trajectories of political projects during conflict is fun-
damentally questioned and civil war comes to be understood as a process of com-
petitive overlapping sovereignties not necessarily moving towards state-building. 
Highlighting the fluidity of power, violence, and territory distributions, this interpre-
tation has stressed the hybrid character of war and peace distinctions. Overall, these 
considerations are underpinned by the idea that state-building is essentially always 
tentative, contingent, negotiated, and state authority and governance are permeated 
with other forms of sovereignty, especially in spaces and contexts at the limits of 
state capacity (Korf et al. 2018). In conflict and post-conflict situations, for exam-
ple, state control of over the means of violence becomes the product of interactions 
and negotiations at multiple levels between multiple actors. In turn, while sovereign 
6 See Staniland 2012 for a more detailed review. 
7 The literature on insurgency fragmentation focuses on splintering processes in non-state armed ac-
tors and emerged from a discontent with dyadic understandings of internal armed conflicts proper of 
quantitative macro and micro-level analysis. The literature on rebel governance deals with the organ-
ization of civilian life during civil war and issues of governance revolving around non-state armed 
actors. It emerged from a discontent with conceptualizations of civil wars as gloomy spaces of chaos 
and anarchy and concepts of failed states and ungoverned spaces proper of neorealist approaches. 
Finally, the literature on armed political orders looks at the interactions between non-state and state 
actors in an attempt to grasp the fluidity of violence and territorial control during conflict. 
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violence is closely related to state formation and transformation, the processes con-
nected to availability and control of weapons have an impact on the enforcement of 
authority and vice versa.  
Notwithstanding these crucial developments, which operated a shift to-
wards the study of the meso-levels of civil wars and their politics, arms dynamics 
have remained relatively under-researched and relegated although evidently relevant.  
 
3. Arms and Insurgency 
While some dedicated studies illuminated particular aspects of the links be-
tween arms and conflict8, generally speaking arms issues have been treated as symp-
toms and implications of conflict by the literature on civil war. At the end of the 
2000s, the considerable body of work on SALW was systematized into three main 
strands: weapons and warfare (particularly civil war), crime and armed violence 
within societies, and governance matters (Greene & Marsh 2012). The work of 
Greene and Marsh provided a more comprehensive understanding of the linkages 
between arms and armed violence through the adoption of localised, non-state-
centric, frameworks and epistemologies in line with the broader “local turn” in 
peace studies (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2013). Some cross-cutting themes were 
streamlined, highlighting the intersectionality of the relations between firearms and 
armed violence across the lines of those strands. First, emphasis was placed on the 
relationships between control over means of violence and processes of state 
(trans)formation. Moving away from Weberian conceptions, it was pointed out how 
no monolithic state monopoly over the use of violence exists and patterns of weap-
ons possession and use are instead the result of changing negotiations between dif-
ferent actors (Greene & Marsh 2012, p. 8). Second, small arms governance was un-
derstood as multi-level and involving a multiplicity of actors. Third, weapons were 
conceptualized not as mere artefacts, but as technologies involving more important 
8 Specifically: the links between global diffusion of SALW, conflict intensity, and the potentialities of 
control instruments (Boutwell & Klare 1999); the role of arms in conflict initiation and escalation 
(Sislin & Pearson 2001); weapons proliferation, arming patterns, and acquisition of arms in conflict 
(Krause 1995; Lumpe 2000; Pearson & Sislin 1998; Bourne 2007). 
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social and political factors. Thus, the conclusion was drawn that ‘the inter-
relationships between SALW availabilities and flows (…) and armed violence, con-
flict and development (…) are important in a wide range of contexts, but they are 
more complex, dynamic and context-dependent than generally thought’ (Greene & 
Marsh 2012, p.251). It is on the base of these openings that, drawing from the re-
cent developments in the literature on civil war, I try to offer a systematization of 
the interrelations between SALW and insurgency.  
The focus here is on how the availability and control of weapons impacts 
on the dynamics of authority in insurgency. As a form of technology, weapons are 
at interplay with social dynamics/drivers and integral to the formation and character 
of socio-political orders (Greene & Marsh 2012, p.9, 255). A major implication, that 
I draw from research on small arms and armed violence, is the reconceptualization 
of weapons availability and control dynamics as catalysts of the distributive and 
constitutive functions of violence. In this sense, weapons should be conceptualized 
as meta-resources, rather than mere resources: in other words, as technologies/tools 
the acquisition and control of which is mutually interrelated with the constitution of 
authority and power as well as with the distribution of control over resources, terri-
tory, and political arrangements. Certainly, as it has been noted, while violence dy-
namics are relevant, political orders can emerge, exist, and evolve in its absence 
(Staniland 2017). Notwithstanding this, violence cannot be reduced to mono-
dimensional understandings, whereby it entails much more than mere physical ac-
tion and can shape orders even in the absence of actual direct violence, especially 
considering the long-term duration of its effects (Schlichte 2009; Jabri 2007). Con-
ceiving arms as meta-resources means highlighting the potential impacts that the 
processes connected to the physical-material and social aspects of availability and 
control over weapons have on the socio-political dynamics of conflict. It means 
moving away from a deterministic approach to one emphasising material aspects as 
a dimension of social and political relations. Along these lines, the relationships be-
tween arms and insurgency can be systematized by conceiving weapons as: 1) meta-
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resources to be acquired by insurgents in order to uphold a given agenda, 2) meta-
resources to be controlled at different levels throughout insurgency. 
 
3.1. Arms as Meta-resources to be Acquired 
Concerning the first aspect, I look at how the acquisition of firearms by 
non-state actors impacts on authority in the structure of insurgency. To do so I 
draw extensively on and further develop the work of Nicolas Marsh (2007), who 
first explored the impact of arms availability and acquisition on the trajectories of 
civil wars. The author argued that the mode of weapons acquisition is a function of 
availability of weapons and control over their acquisition by insurgents. Marsh de-
fines arms availability as the ‘extent to which a group’s objectives are not con-
strained by a lack of specific weapons or ammunition’ (Marsh 2007, p.60). Thus, 
availability is understood not as quantity of arms present, but in terms of access to 
specific types of weapons in relation to groups’ objectives. Access to arms presents 
both spatial/ geographical aspects and logistic aspects. In fact, the location of 
weapons in respect to groups’ areas of insurgency, morphology, distribution of ter-
ritorial control, and socio-political relations between different actors in conflict are 
all crucial. Moreover, the question of who holds weapons supplies, the capacity of 
state authorities to prevent leakages from stockpiles, or the support of bordering 
states, represent important factors in determining availability. Control over weapons 
acquisition, instead, is understood as an organizational aspect of insurgent groups: it 
has to do with whether control of arms acquisition is diffused or centralized - or-
ganized at the individual/unit, sub-commanders, or leadership level. Thus, it is im-
portant to note that availability and control over arms acquisition can change over 
time and the mode of weapons acquisition is interlinked with changes in the struc-
ture of insurgency.   
Following Marsh’s framework, one should expect a correspondence be-
tween mode of weapons acquisition by insurgents and the configurations insurgen-
cies. If the former is maintained by the leadership of a single group the insurgency 
will be unitary, while if different leaders have access and control acquisition then the 
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civil war will be characterized by ‘warlordism’. When instead single combatants or 
units’ commanders can autonomously acquire weapons, the insurgency will be 
structured around several fragmented groups (Marsh 2007, 2012; Strazzari & 
Tholens 2014). This framework has proven both instrumental in advancing a more 
nuanced conception of arms availability and in raising attention to the specificity of 
the issue of control over weapons acquisition. Nonetheless, in Marsh the concept of 
insurgency and the structure of insurgency remained underexplored and no consid-
eration was given to internal control of arms subsequent to acquisition and armed 
groups interactions.  
Insurgency shall be conceived as a two-level concept: as the activity of a 
single non-state actor, and/or as the multiplicity of different insurgent groups oper-
ating during conflict and their interactions. To understand the structure of an insur-
gent group I draw from work by McQuinn (2016). McQuinn argues that a crucial 
feature of ANSAs’ organizations is the command profile, which he defines as the 
way authority is organized and enforced within the group. Authority can be organ-
ized formally, meaning that it is placed in the hierarchy/structure, or it can be or-
ganized informally, meaning that it rests on sub-commanders’ hands.9 Essentially, 
the assumption is that when the command profile of an armed group is formalized, 
the group is centrally controlled, while when the command profile is informal the 
group is controlled in a decentralized fashion. Concerning the other aspect of insur-
gency, meaning the relationships between ANSAs, I propose to draw from the ty-
pology of armed orders conceptualised by Staniland (2017, p.460). The author has 
identified situations of conflict actors’ interactions (applicable also to inter-ANSAs 
relations). These are: hostilities, limited cooperation, alliance, collapse, and incorpo-
ration (Ibid). On the base of this canvas, the central question for the second part 
9 McQuinn provides further elements to discern between formal and informal ANSA’s command 
profiles. Formalized armed groups hold a formal code of conduct and quasi-judicial mechanisms to 
internally control members, while informal command profiles coincide with no or little formalization 
in the code of conduct and no quasi-judicial mechanism. Indicators that are used to analyse the 
formalization of the command profile of ANSAs consist in the codes of conduct and induction 
process (whether these are rituals or formal training). In addition to these two features the presence 
or absence of uniforms, daily political training, established systems of rank and physical training are 
also considered (Kenny 2010; McQuinn 2015; Siebold 2007). 
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concerns how the mode of weapons acquisition by non-state armed actors affects 
authority in the structure of insurgency.  
 
3.2. Arms as Meta-resources to Be Controlled: Non-State Firearms Controls and Governance 
A neglected aspect of the role of weapons in insurgencies is the question 
of control mechanisms over these meta-resources during conflict. While an impor-
tant strand of the literature on SALW has offered a critical analysis of the function-
ing and development of multi-level systems of arms governance (Bourne et al 2003; 
Krause 2002; Laurence & Stohl 2002; Greene & Marsh 2012), research on these 
themes tended to adopt a compartmentalized perspective focusing on “pre” and 
“post” phases, disregarding instead forms of firearms control enacted during hostili-
ties. Central to this body of work has been the adoption of the concept of govern-
ance (rather than mere government). SALW governance consists in ‘the (…) proc-
esses, norms, systems and institutions that shape, regulate, manage or control the 
production, flows, availability and uses of SALW and associated armed violence and 
insecurity (Greene & Marsh 2012, p.164).’ 
In areas where state sovereignty and the monopoly over violence are com-
plex and formal institutions absent or constrained, societal forms of arms control 
are the primary channel of arms governance. Focusing in particular on communities 
(as locally bounded in a given space), Ashkenazi (2012) has suggested how various 
non-state actors such as social elites, gangs, and traditional or informal authorities 
often mobilize informal social processes to control firearms Armed non-state actors 
as well have a say in the control of firearms possession and use. ANSAs regulate the 
possession and use of arms internally with their members, and amongst the popula-
tion in areas they control. In this regard, some considerations can be noted. First, 
since territorial control is a scope condition for governance to be implemented by 
insurgents, the acquisition and control of armaments becomes crucial for groups to 
obtain and hold territory. Second, control over arms by insurgents becomes both a 
mean to legitimize their role offering (external) protection to civilians, and a mean 
to ensure the control of violence against civilians internally to the organization. In 
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this sense, two aspects assume relevance: the internal control of armed violence by 
members, and the provision of security. Security provision can occur through 
community policing or other governance arrangements, and includes the issue of 
safety in relation to armaments. Third, while insurgents retain the initiative, civilians 
can influence how governance is practiced. Although it constitutes a limit to civilian 
influence, coercion is not a constant but can instead fluctuate from one side to the 
other and basically depends on what has been termed as the “imbalance of weap-
ons” (Kasfir 2015). Relations between rebels and civilians partly depend on the rela-
tive threat armed groups and population pose to each other (Mao 1963). Ashke-
nazi’s contribution identified two main patterns of weapons control by communi-
ties: the use of incentives and sanctions; and the symbolic and ritualistic aspects at-
tached to the weapon within societies (Ashkenazi 2012, p.228). The use of incen-
tives and sanctions essentially functions through the establishment of an implicit or 
explicit social negotiation between weapons holders/users and community mem-
bers.10 The characterization of guns by their users and society acts as a controlling 
mechanism by substituting the actual use for the symbol, and by determining ap-
propriate and inappropriate uses, users, or owners connected to contingencies and 
social rules (Ibid., p.241-243). 
 
Part II | Acquiring Meta-resources: Mode of Weapons Acquisition and the 
Configuration of Insurgencies in Myanmar and Ukraine 
This part attempts to empirically explore the relationships between AN-
SAs’ mode of weapons acquisition and authority structures of insurgency. The issue 
of firearms as meta-resources to be controlled is not explored due to lack of data. 
The two settings of armed conflict in Myanmar and Ukraine are analysed as embed-
ded case studies, i.e. layered on the base of different ANSAs and insurgencies. The 
following sections look at each setting through the framework presented in Part I.  
10 Ashkenazi notes four types of patterns in which these bargain manifest: the use of prestige and 
prestige recognition as a bargaining chip; social agreements that violence has surpassed an unbear-
able threshold and needs to be limited; the bargaining power of civilians in conflict contexts vis à vis 
combatants in need of resources, information or complicity; the dynamics of feuds (blood vengeance 
feuds and feuds based upon economic or political power struggles) (Ashkenazi 2012, p. 234-237). 
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4. Myanmar 
After independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Burma descended 
into civil war and numerous different insurgencies have since swept the country up 
until today. A very fragmented and heterogeneous control over the use of organized 
violence characterizes the complex political scenario surrounding the peace process 
initiated in the first half of the 2000s, which slowly led to the 2015 National Cease-
fire Agreement (NCA).11 To date, ten Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) have 
signed the NCA, while some of the major armed groups continue fighting with the 
Tatmadaw (the Myanmar Armed Forces) and the government.12 In addition, pock-
ets of dissent and de facto autonomy also exist in areas controlled by the latter or by 
ceasefire EAOs. Against this landscape, weapons have long constituted an impor-
tant commodity, featuring as both trafficked goods and assets to uphold authority. 
 
4.1. Arms Availability  
Although the very concept of firearms market is contested and often mis-
used, Southeast Asia is usually taken as an example of the existence of distinct re-
gional structures of licit and illicit circulation of firearms (Bourne 2007). The major 
sources and dynamics of arms proliferation in the region have been connected to 
the legacy of conflicts and legal and covert supplies of arms channelled with in-
volvement of state apparatuses. 
11 The peace process that led to the signature of the NCA was formally initiated by the “roadmap to 
discipline flourishing democracy” first announced in 2003. The roadmap was a seven-steps process 
conceived by the Tatmadaw to accompany the country towards the establishment of a stable democ-
ratic political system. 
12 Under the Thein Sein administration eight EAOs signed the NCA in 2015: the Karen National 
Union (KNU), the Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNLA-PC), the Democratic 
Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Revolutionary Council of Shan State-Shan State Army South 
(RCSS-SSAS), the All Burma Student’s Democratic Front (ABSDF), the Chin National Front (CNF), 
the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) and the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP). See 
ACLED (2016), Peace in Myanmar?, https://www.acleddata.com/2016/03/03/peace-in-myanmar/.  
Two more EAOs joined in February 2018: the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democ-
ratic Union (LDU). 
The following EAOs have not signed yet: the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Kachin Independ-
ence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), their allies of the Ta’ang National Lib-
eration Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP),  Na-
tionalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Kaplan (NSCN-K), the National Democratic Alliance Army 
(NDAA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Shan State Progressive 
Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA-N), and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). 
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During World War II, Burma emerged as a strategic buffer zone in South-
East Asia and in the immediate post-WWII period weapons were widely available in 
the country (Myint-U 2011; Gibson & Chen 2011). Throughout the 1960s and 70s, 
considerable flows were channelled into the region by the U.S., China, and USSR 
(Tholens 2012, p.101; Chouvy 2013, p.92). It has been estimated that in the after-
math of the Vietnam War in 1975, Vietnam and Cambodia were home to 2 million 
weapons and 150.000 tons of ammunition (Chouvy 2013). At the beginning of the 
2000s, before the European Union’s Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (EU-ASAC) disarmament program was carried out, figures estimated the 
presence of 500.000 to 1 million SALW in Cambodia (Tholens 2012, p.71). The 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB), as well as armed groups in NE India at times, 
was supported by China, while Thailand favoured the strengthening of Shan and 
Karen armed groups to counterbalance the presence of communist formations on 
its territory. Cold War patterns of arms supply and proliferation seem to have re-
tained significant impact on the creation and consolidation of regional structures of 
weapons accumulation and circulation (Bourne 2007, p.163). More recently, the 
main source of SALW has been represented by the Chinese grey market and cross-
border supplies to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), especially between the sec-
ond-half of the 2000s and 2013 ca.13 
Generally speaking, four main sub-regional areas have represented impor-
tant hubs of proliferation and trafficking of weapons in Southeast Asia: the South-
ern trait of the eastern Myanmar border with Thailand; the so-called “Golden Tri-
angle” intersecting Myanmar’s Shan State, Laos, and Thailand just beneath Yunnan 
Province in China; the border areas between Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India; and, 
lastly, arms have also flowed from the Northern and North-eastern borders of 
Myanmar to the western borders with India. Interestingly, these areas ideally match 
with the borderlands of Myanmar and reflect heterogeneous geographical, topog-
raphical, and socio-political characteristics of its territory. Across these four main 
proliferation areas, overall civilian firearms availability has traditionally been poor in 
13 Interview with independent consultant, September 2018, Bangkok. 
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Myanmar borderlands, although various types of weapons are available to ANSAs. 
Assault rifles are quite ubiquitous, especially AK patterns of Chinese production.14 
Light weapons are also available and trafficked, although overall less frequently and 
with prevalence in northern Shan State and Kachin.15 Ammunition are trafficked as 
well, although there seem to be a general trend of decreasing availability started 
around the second half of the 2000s, especially on the Myanmar-Thai border.16  
Concerning the response of central governments to the proliferation of 
arms and ANSAs, the year 1988 is generally considered as a watershed for Myanmar 
civil wars and state-building processes. After decades of repression and political and 
economic isolationism, in 1988 the country appeared as an isolated core, sur-
rounded by politically and economically connected borderlands, opposing central 
authorities as a result of longstanding frictions between centrifugal and centripetal 
political projects (Meehan 2011, p. 384). Massive public protests against Ne Win’s 
regime, China’s changing interests concerning its neighbourhood and the falling 
apart of Cold War structures are often recalled as the main factors underpinning a 
crucial shift in the Myanmar’s state-building process (Myint-U 2011; Meehan 2011; 
Wood 2016; Gravers 2016). At the core of this shift laid also changing relations be-
tween the Tatmadaw and ANSAs controlling the borderlands. Apart from modern-
izing its arsenal and restructuring its forces17, the Tatmadaw and military govern-
ments revisited their long-held militia programs while shifting strategy to engage 
14 Most common are the Type 56, Type 81, M-22, M-23, M16s and AR15s. Older rifles such as SKS, 
M1s and M14 are also present. 
15 In particular grenade launchers M79, M203, SAM and SA7, mortars, recoilless rifles, machine 
guns, heavy machine guns of 12.7 mm calibre, anti-aircraft machine guns, mines and home-made 
mines. 15 Most light weapons are in the possession of the UWSA, Kachin Independence Army 
(KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) to a lesser 
extent. In the last years 107 surface to surface rocket launchers and anti-materiel rifles (Zijiang M99) 
have been acquired by the UWSA and apparently sold to the KIA and Arakan Army (AA). Interview 
with independent consultant, September 2018, Bangkok. 
16 Personal conversations with independent researcher specialized in southeast Myanmar and high-
level humanitarian worker with more than ten years experience in mine action in Cambodia, 
September 2018, Yangon. In addition see Suthep Chaviwan, Suthep Chaviwan 2008, Guerrillas battle 
rising costs, Bangkok Post (recirculated by Thai Asia Church Herald), 21 December, viewed in 
March and April 2018, < http://thaiasiachurchherald.blogspot.com/2009/08/guerrillas-battle-
rising-costs.html >  
17 With purchases of SALW from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore and China and mortar shells from Viet-
nam. 
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with EAOs. Arguing that the nature of the governments was a purely transitional 
one to lead the country towards a new constitution and elections18, they began to 
offer pure military truces accompanied by economic incentives to EAOs, conclud-
ing a total of 40 ceasefires in about two decades (Buchanan 2016). In such a land-
scape of ceasefire capitalism (Wood 2011), larger EAOs would receive more fa-
vourable incentives and delimitation of territory with relative autonomy. While par-
tial or complete disarmament as well as shrinking of territorial space and transfor-
mation into army-controlled militias were reserved to smaller ones or splinter fac-
tions19 (Buchanan 2016, p.14). These agreements concentrated mostly in Kachin 
and Shan states whereas, notwithstanding some exceptions, hostilities continued 
throughout the southeast of the country. 
The converted groups would retain their weapons and obtain business in-
centives and concessions while remaining subordinated to the army, in order for the 
latter to regain control over the borderlands. Between 1989 to 2008-2010, many 
non-state armed groups were converted into pro-government militias and approxi-
mately 16 bilateral ceasefires were signed20 (Meehan 2011, p.388-9; Jolliffe & Bain-
bridge 2017). From 2009 on, the Tatmadaw’s strategy shifted towards a more ag-
gressive policy pushing for EAOs transformation into paramilitary units directly 
controlled by the Army and engrafted into its structure with different degrees of in-
tegration through the so-called Border Guard Forces (BGF) and People’s Militia 
Forces (PMFs) programs. These programs entailed a sort of disarmament and de-
mobilisation process in combination with indirect reform of the Union forces’ 
structure. If on the one hand the underlying political issues at the roots of hostilities 
continued to remain unresolved, on the other hand the micro-political economy of 
the borderlands was being reconfigured. The BGF and PMFs scheme were de-
ployed as proxy forces by the Tatmadaw to exert control over territories outside 
18 In this sense the names of the two military governments in power between 1988 and 2011 are self 
explanatory: State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC). 
19 The practice of co-optation and militia formation has a long history in Myanmar, as revealed by 
the use of the term  ‘Ka Kwe Ye’ or ‘Pyithusit’ as synecdoche to refer to many types of local armed 
groups somehow connected to the armed forces. See Smith 1999; Ruzza 2015; and Buchanan 2016. 
20 Of these 15 transformed into militias. 
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their de facto sovereignty (Buchanan 2016, p.22). Consequently, renewed fighting 
between the Tatmadaw and several EAOs such as the Kachin Independence Army 
(KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and TNLA 
sparked since 2009-11, leading to a further change of attitude by the army. The issue 
of non-state armed groups transformation was disjointed from the negotiations that 
later led to the 2015 NCA. The changing geopolitical landscapes and state-building 
strategy of the Tatmadaw arguably corresponded to different dynamics of weapons 
proliferation and arms acquisition by non-state armed actors. 
 
4.2. Control Over Acquisition, Authority and Insurgencies 
Karen State and Thai-Myanmar Border  
Towards the end of the 1980s, these areas were characterized by a plurality 
of sources of weapons proliferation. At the time, the civil conflict in Cambodia was 
gradually scaling down and until 1998 weapons continued to proliferate often 
through systematic larger transfers operated with the involvement of Cambodian, 
Thai, and at times Burmese authorities. In addition, arms proliferated through leak-
age from Thai state stockpiles. Thai authorities were also involved in the supply of 
weapons to Karen groups directly or indirectly deployed as proxies to contain the 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and armed groups involved in drug trafficking 
(Brenner 2017, p.6; Bourne 2007, p.129 and 167). Generally speaking though, by the 
end of the 2000s weapons availability and access had become increasingly scarce 
and difficult along the Thai-Myanmar border. This trend was particularly accentu-
ated with regard to ammunition, as the doubling of prices compared to the 1990s 
would suggest (Chaiwan 2008).21 Several factors impinged on the accessibility of 
Cambodian sources. By 2005-6 efforts to address weapons proliferation in the 
country had been successfully translated in disarmament activities and significant 
improvements in Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) in the 
framework of EU-ASAC (SEESAC 2006). Furthermore, the Thai government had 
already started to implement harder policies against alleged terrorist organizations in 
21 Apparently the cost for a single round of ammunition raised from 10 baht to 20-25 baht. 
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the wake of 9/11 and the 2002 Bali attacks. In addition, since the end of the 1990s 
economic interests mainly connected to logging concessions in Karen areas and the 
growing control of the Tatmadaw over that borderland had led to policy change 
towards the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and Thailand’s attitude 
towards the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNU/KNLA) and armed actors in Myanmar had been clearly reversed (Chouvy 
2013, p.96-7). Lastly, these shifts coincided with the turn in Tatmadaw’s counterin-
surgency strategy and increased military pressure on Karen lines as a consequence 
of the ceasefire agreements signed with armed groups operating in Shan and Kachin 
areas.  
Weapons access and acquisition processes in these areas followed a trajec-
tory similar to that of the most important armed group, the KNU/KNLA, which 
started shrinking and fragmenting (Irrawaddy 2008). One should note that internal 
fragmentation has represented a longstanding feature of Karen societies (Gravers 
2016, p.389). The same could be said for the KNU/KNLA’s structure, which could 
be described as politically centralized but logistically relatively loosely integrated. Al-
though the group has traditionally organized the territory of Karen state into seven 
different districts under central command, there have always been discrepancies be-
tween corresponding KNLA brigades in charge (Brenner 2017, p.3). Particularly, 
flow and mobilization processes should have been centralized in principle but in re-
ality, each brigade has been autonomous in recruitment and financing over its areas 
of competence (Ibid.). The same holds true regarding weapons acquisition, whereby 
apparently the process has been controlled at brigade rather than leadership level.22 
The quarter master general of the KNU remains a powerful central authority with 
power over brigades and privileged connection with governments, but brigade 
structures have managed and procured their own weapons.23  
The process that led to the signing of the 2012 bilateral ceasefire agree-
ment was one characterized by internal fragmentation, contestations and changing 
22 Interview with independent researcher.  
23 Ibid. 
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power dynamics amongst brigades. The mid-1990s marked the starting point of the 
KNU/KNLA’s decline. A decline that had already begun with the fragmentation of 
the group when the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) emerged, formed 
by Buddhist members of the KNLA and Karen National Defence Organization 
(KNDO).24 The DKBA sided with the Tatmadaw and turned against KNLA’s bri-
gades 7 and 6 - which represented the organizational core of the KNU, presiding 
the headquarters in Mannerplaw and the main smuggling routes (Brenner 2017). Af-
ter years of progressive shrinking, in 2007 a new splinter group named 
KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC) emerged due to the signing of a bilateral cease-
fire between brigade 7 commander and the SPDC government. Around the same 
years, the 5th brigade of the DKBA detached itself from the latter as a consequence 
of the organization’s decision to enter the BGF program. Overall, Brenner has de-
scribed these events as a progressive ‘shifting internal power balance from central to 
northern units of the KNLA, particularly to Mutraw’s Brigade 5’ (Brenner 2017, 
p.3). The latter today represents the last stronghold of the Karen insurgency not-
withstanding the group’s eventual adherence to the NCA in October 2015. Appar-
ently, the decrease of weapons flows and the loss of control over trafficking routes 
by Brigades 6 and 7 accentuated already existent decentralized weapons prolifera-
tion processes that allowed single brigades to be operationally autonomous. 
Kachin State and Shan State  
While access to weapons was significantly hampered for groups operating 
in the South-Eastern regions of Myanmar, different patterns characterized the 
northern Shan State and Kachin state. Throughout the Cold War the CPB remained 
the privileged recipient of Chinese weapons supplies. With the fragmentation of the 
CPB25, Chinese instances found in the UWSA a primary interlocutor. In the 1990s, 
the PLA started a severe modernization process of its arsenal, which generated con-
24 The Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) is a KNU-affiliated village defence militia 
from which the armed wing of the movement (the Karen National Liberation Army) first originated 
(Brenner 2017, p. 3; and Gravers 2016). 
25 The group crumbled apart into four different splinter factions: the UWSA, Myanmar National 
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and New De-
mocratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K). 
208 
 
 
Francesco Buscemi, Armed Political Orders through the Prism of Arms 
 
siderable SALW surpluses. Despite Bejiing’s collection efforts, Yunnan-based for-
mer and active military personnel transferred arms to the UWSA (Chouvy 2013, 
p.99; Lintner 2015, p.133). UWSA has operated control over weapons acquisition 
processes at leadership level and these supplies created a sort of spill-over effect 
that triggered the circulation of older weapons in UWSA’s hands towards other 
EAOs in Northern Shan State. Besides, during this period the UWSA also acted as 
broker facilitating other groups’ weapons acquisition through Chinese channels. 
During the last decades, although Chinese-Burmese relations improved and China 
direct weapons supplies scaled down, drug trafficking remained a major source of 
income to purchase arms and the role of peripheral political and military structures 
in Yunnan was key to entrench the position of the group and its control over 
Pangkham and the Wa Special Region no.2. The group set up a modernisation 
process since 2010-12, year in which it signed a renewed ceasefire agreement with 
the Tatmadaw. Through networks rooted in Yunnan and passive or active support 
from Beijing, in the last three decades the UWSA was able to consolidate its status 
of strategic buffer zone between China and Myanmar. In addition, it emerged as the 
leader group of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Council 
(FPNCC).26 To date, the UWSA has remained outside the NCA repeatedly demand-
ing its substitution with a different nationwide truce before taking any step in the 
actual peace process. 
The KIA as well entertained strong relations with the CPB and was able to 
purchase supplies from the PLA at times (Lintner 2015, p.128; Yawnghwe 1987, 
p.233). With the crumbling of the CPB, the KIA has been able to secure weapons 
access with the UWSA, although intermittently and not without difficulties. Appar-
ently, the group severely suffered from lack of ammunition in recent times, al-
though it continues fighting with the Tatmadaw (Chouvy 2013, p.99). In 1994, KIA 
signed a ceasefire with the government, which remained in place until 2011 (Sadan 
2016). The so-called ‘ceasefire capitalism’ strategy adopted by the Tatmadaw during 
26 Political alliance of seven ANSAs aiming to the substitution of the NCA before embarking on a 
peace process for the constitution of a federal democratic union in Myanmar. 
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those years and constant pressure to adhere to the BGF scheme, especially after the 
demise of Peng Jiasheng’s MNDAA in 2009, fuelled internal frictions within the 
KIO/A (Woods 2011). Since then, the Tatmadaw has steadily scaled up military 
pressure to unprecedented levels until nowadays while, on the other hand, KIA 
supported the emergence of other EAOs.27  
Control over weapons acquisition has been centrally organized at the lead-
ership level by the KIA which is renowned for retaining arms procurement dedi-
cated officers and alleged manufacturing capacity.28 While the territory controlled by 
the KIA has always been geographically and logistically isolated, progressive waves 
of attacks and continued implementation of the 4-cuts counter-insurgency strategy 
by the Tatmadaw have aggravated the connections between different KIA’s bri-
gades and the HQ in Laiza, as well as amongst the former themselves (Davis 2018). 
Generally speaking the group has always been affected by its isolation and found it 
difficult to establish regular weapons supply lines. KIA’s relations with UWSA have 
always been more tenuous than those between the latter and other non-state armed 
actors in Northern Shan State. In very recent times this lack of access to weapons 
(munitions in particular), has occurred in parallel with an organisational restructur-
ing of forces. Larger territorially fixed brigades have been reshaped into more flexi-
ble and smaller ones (Davis 2018).29 Moreover, single units have also been encour-
aged to carry out seizures on the battlefields.  
Close relations amongst non-state armed actors, characterize also the case 
of the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army 
(PSLF/TNLA). The roots of the PSLF/TNLA can be traced back to 1991, when 
another Palaung organization, the Palaung State Liberation Organization/Army 
(PSLO/A), signed a bilateral ceasefire with the Tatmadaw. PSLO/A was a long-
27 In particular the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA). 
28 With the only potential exception being KIA’s 4th brigade in Kutkai township, northern Shan 
State, which is far from KIO structures and potentially more autonomous (interview with independ-
ent consultant). Allegedly KIA manufactures Type 81-pattern assault rifles but reports and details 
concerning its production capacity are limited and difficult to confirm (phone interview with 
anonymous informant, May 2019). 
29 The group has passed from a total of 5 to 10 brigades, plus two mobile ones. From 4 to 7 brigades 
in Kachin State, and from 1 to 3 in Northern Shan State. 
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time ally of the KIA and its 4th Brigade in particular, and relied heavily on supplies 
provided by the latter (Meehan 2016, p. 368). Left without its primary ally and 
source of ammunition, when the KIA 4th Brigade fragmented into what would have 
later become the Kachin Defence Army (KDA) the PSLO/A was practically forced 
to sign a ceasefire and transform into a government-affiliated militia (Ibid, 369; 
Kumbun 2018). An internal faction to the PSLO/A rejected the agreement and 
constituted the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), which continued to oppose 
the government from the Thai-Myanmar border areas, slowly trying to rebuild its 
military capacity. In April 2005, under its so-called ‘weapons for peace’ disarmament 
program, the Tatmadaw exerted more pressure on the PSLA to hand-in all its arse-
nal, as it did with other groups (South 2008, p.133). With many former combatants 
forcibly reintegrated into the ranks of local militia forces and the PSLF forced to 
withdraw at the Thai border, the PSLA ultimately completely disarmed and ceased 
to exist (Meethan, 2016, p.357). Meehan has underlined that the 2005 disarmament 
and demobilisation of the PSLA left many former elite and rank-and-file members 
dissatisfied and close ties with the KIA allowed to obtain weapons and training 
needed for the constitution of PSLF’s armed wing created in 2009, the TNLA 
(Ibid). Apparently, many TNLA members actually are former PSLA combatants. 
The group’s weapons in part circulated to local militias under the Tatmadaw scheme 
when the PSLA was integrated into these forces in 2005 and, from there, ultimately 
reached the TNLA in 2009 due to former PSLA combatants joining the new armed 
group (Ibid., p.377). Since its inception, today the TNLA has doubled its size pass-
ing from 900-1000 to 6000 combatants.30 At the same time, it has grown more or-
ganized, assuming a brigade structure and controlling weapons acquisition at a cen-
tral, leadership level.31 After the initial crucial role of the KIA, in recent years the 
TNLA has moved closer to UWSA influence/support.32 
 
 
30 Interview with independent consultant, September 2018, Bangkok. 
31 Interview with anonymous informant, September 2018, Kyaukme. 
32 Ibid. 
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5. Ukraine 
Significant patterns of governance, conflict and criminality have repeatedly 
brought to the fore the issue of arms proliferation in Ukraine from various angles in 
the last decades. Over the years, the country’s kaleidoscopic past historical experi-
ences have produced very diverse political settings underpinning the current com-
posite and fragmented configuration of the country. Already existent profound so-
cietal rifts burst in 2013, triggered by the events of Maidan square33, and resulted in 
an ongoing turbulent conjuncture of armed conflict and politico-economic crisis. As 
claimed by Matveeva (2016), the conflict in the country, perhaps another example 
of violent peace (Duffield 2001), did not come unexpected and was the result of so-
cial and political polarization, lack of one Ukrainian identity and unique statehood 
model promoted by the central government.  
 
5.1. Arms Availability 
With the outbreak of conflict in Donbass in 2014, the sheer number of 
small arms and light weapons estimated to be present in Ukraine has spotlighted the 
country as the most complex arms proliferation case in Europe. Firearms are wide-
spread throughout the whole country both in the licit and in the illicit sphere, al-
though not homogeneously. According to (conservative) estimates, Ukraine is con-
sidered to be home to a total of 4 to 5 million firearms – 2 million in the licit sphere 
and from 2 to 3 million in the illicit one (Martyniuk 2017).34 Weapons are not ubiq-
uitous and access is not without barriers but arms still remain fairly available in con-
siderable quantities and varieties of types. 
Several sources of weapons fed the first armed formations sprouted up 
from the events of Maidan and anti-Maidan. Between the First and the Second 
33 Although several transcription techniques for Ukrainian and Russian languages exist, the text tries 
to adhere to the more conventional norms and respect the transcriptions used by single authors of 
the sources consulted. 
34 To put these figures into perspective, suffice it to remind that the Western Balkans is home to 5 to 
6 million registered and unregistered firearms. See Carapic, 2014. 
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World War present-day Ukraine was swept by several armed conflicts35: weapons 
originating from these conflicts have traditionally been stored in households, while 
those in military stocks later became obsolete and generated surpluses after the 
manufacture of the AK rifle (Ferguson & Jenzen-Jones 2014). Furthermore, as part 
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the Ukrainian SSR was home to huge 
military stockpiles, troop deployments, and weapons factories as it configured a 
third echelon of defense in the stratified Soviet military strategy (Griffith 2010; 
Griffith & Karp 2008). With the dismantling of the Pact, vast arsenals were stocked 
into the country by withdrawing soviet troops deployed in eastern Europe. This 
generated disproportionate surplus due to the subsequent downsizing of the 
Ukrainian Army (Chivers 2005).36 Internal armed conflicts and patterns of state col-
lapse in the crumbling of socialist systems at the regional level, such as the civil war 
in the adjacent Transnistria region of Moldova, the Wars of Yugoslav Secession, 
and the two wars in Chechnya, also contributed to firearms proliferation (Munteanu 
2014; Martyniuk 2017). Finally, Ukraine is as well home to considerable SALW 
manufacturers.37 Other significant sources of illicit firearms are the conversion of 
replica firearms and craft-production of weapons within criminal milieus (King 
2015). 
Proliferation and trafficking of arms are not homogeneous phenomena but 
rather present different characteristics throughout different areas. With the outbreak 
of the Donbass conflict, though not necessarily as a direct consequence of it, weap-
ons availability has been largely related to the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone 
and movements from/to the ATO. Nonetheless, the Southern, South-Eastern and 
also Western parts of the country host important logistic hubs for criminal net-
35 Eastern Galicia was the theatre of the Polish-Ukrainian war fought in 1918 and 1919 following 
WWI. In the same years, the rest of the country was experiencing a civil conflict that later led to the 
formation of the Ukrainian SSR in 1922. Two decades later, the extremely fragmented configuration 
of the country re-emerged once again with the outbreak and unfolding of WWII. 
36 Chivers quantified in 2.5 million tons of conventional munitions and more than 7 million small 
arms. 
37 In particular, concerning SALW production: the State Enterprise “Lugansk Cartridge”, located in 
the Luhansk region (which produces ammunition for SALW); the State Enterprise “Design Bureau 
Artillery Armament”; the Tasko Corporation; and the “State-Owned Science-Industrial Association 
"Fort” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. 
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works, such as Odessa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv. At a regional level, the 
bulk of arms trafficking comes from and moves towards the Russian Federation, 
although episodes of trafficking involving Transnistria and Belarus are sometimes 
reported. The two border regions between Ukraine and Poland, Volyn and Lviv ob-
lasts, are both renown for their illicit networks, especially concerning amber illicit 
extraction and commercialization. These networks are often closely entangled with 
far-right movements. Diversification is a key feature also when it comes to the types 
of weapons that have circulated in Ukraine. From ammunition to light weapons, 
small arms and explosives, a wide panoply of arms can be acquired.38 Light weapons 
are relatively widespread: the availability of shells for light weapons, various calibers 
of ammunition, anti-tank weapons, and RPG’s39 turn Ukraine into a very relevant 
in-land source of weapons in perspective. In the case of Ukraine, the most crucial 
dynamic of arms proliferation seems to be the leakage of weapons from state stock-
piles through various channels: theft, capture during hostilities, or embezzlement. 
Moreover, seizures often reported cases of trafficking, involving allegedly antagonis-
tic conflict actors and defectors. 
 
5.2. Weapons Acquisition and Armed Orders in Donbass 
In order to assess the trajectory of the insurgency and the evolution of 
non-state actors’ control over weapons acquisition, the remainder looks at the out-
break of hostilities and the first phases of the Donbass insurgency in 2013-2014. 
The insurgency is divided into three phases. Phase one, from Maidan square dem-
onstrations and the rise of anti-maidan movements, to the emergence of the first 
embryonic organized groups. Phase two, from the creation of Maidan Self-Defence 
Forces (SDFs) to the constitution of paramilitary Battalions; and from the organiza-
tion of civil defence forces to the emergence of militias in Donbass. Phase three, 
from the Donbass militias to the creation of the DNR and LNR armed groups. 
 
38 For a more detailed description see Duquet 2018. 
39 More specifically RPG-7 and RPG-18, 22 and 26, as well as rocket propelled launchers (MRO-A 
and RPO-A). 
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Phase I  
As early as the beginning of December of 2013 Self Defence Forces (SDF 
- Samooborona) began to form in the context of Maidan square demonstrations, 
supported by political movements opposing former president Viktor Yanukovich 
and aimed at countering Berkut (special riot police) units (Kudelia 2016). As the 
bottom-up organization of demonstrators turned into active upheaval and open 
clashes, the streets’ arsenals evolved from everyday objects to stones, smoking and 
incendiary grenades, legally or illegally possessed civilian firearms (Ferguson & Jen-
zen-Jones 2014; BBC 2014).40 Extreme-right wing groups quickly begun to hijack 
demonstrations especially through direct involvement of SDFs (Ishchenko 2016; 
Gatehouse 2015). While the heavy crackdown on revolts amplified the role of 
SDFs, many across the political opposition exploited the key position acquired by 
extreme-right groups in SDFs (Kudelia 2016). As early depicted by the 18th Febru-
ary 2014 march on Kiev’s Instituskaya street, SDFs had quickly consolidated their 
role amongst protesters lines and were structured into battalions, formally under the 
unified command of Andriy Parubiy (Gatehouse 2015; Balmforth 2014).41 In addi-
tion, weapons were distributed during protests and firing positions set up in the 
Conservatory and Hotel Ukraine (Gatehouse 2015). As fighting in the streets un-
folded, SDFs raided Kyiv’s police departments, prosecutor and SBU’s offices and 
garrisons, seizing weapon caches and literally arming Maidan. The gradual hijacking 
of the revolts by Pravy Sector culminated with the seizure of government and law 
enforcement authorities’ offices in western and central Ukraine. 
Due to the evident intertwining between extreme-right movements and 
SDFs, in Donbass the spectre of nationalism provided a justification for the crea-
tion of civil defence forces to protect people from the new government. The first 
units of civil defence were formed in Donetsk and Luhansk in the winter 
2013/2014 under the auspices of the centrist Russophile Party of Regions (Kudelia 
2016). While the latter promoted the creation of these groups, their constitution was 
40 Such as gas and air weapons, hunting and sporting guns and craft-produced weapons. 
41 The Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) since 14 April 2016. 
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financed by businesses in Donbass belonging to party networks. Initially the arming 
channels of defence groups consisted in the aggregation of civilian firearms and 
leakages from local official stashes. The overthrowing of the Yanukovich govern-
ment triggered a re-articulation of the political movement along the lines of differ-
ent businessmen figures’ patronage groups (Kudelia 2016). It should be noted that 
armed forces personnel were enmeshed in these networks at both the national and 
local level. The initially bottom-up civil defence groups became embedded into 
these networks triangulating local and regional patrons, armed forces authorities, 
and separatist leaders. 
Phase II  
With the ousting of former president Yanukovich, societal rifts intertwined 
with the protracted deterioration that had characterized the Ukrainian security appa-
ratuses since independence (Matveeva 2016; Griffith & Karp 2008; Aliyev 2016, 
502). Leveraging on the entanglement of political and armed structures, the key 
groups leading Maidan consolidated and expanded their role, as became clear 
amidst the worsening of the security context in Donbass during the spring 2014 
(Puglisi 2015). The dismantling of Ministry of Interior special forces and their inte-
gral substitution with the newly created National Guard can be understood as an at-
tempt to reshape state structures on the outcomes of Maidan. In fact, although the 
disbandment of all armed groups sprouted up from the revolts was sanctioned with 
a parliamentary decree dated 1st of April 2014, the formation of territorial defence 
battalions (Batalony Territorialnoi Oborony) had already been mandated in March 
with an official presidential decree, and the first volunteer battalions were formed 
between April and May (Puglisi 2015). Behind the organization of volunteer battal-
ions stood an intertwining of political movements, entrepreneurs and oligarchs 
(Roth 2014; Baczynska 2015).42 These non-state armed groups pursued both institu-
tional and political legitimation as reflected by the October 2014 parliamentary elec-
42 Key politico-business figures financing the creation of paramilitary groups. For instance, the role 
of Ihor Kolomoisky as funder of Dniepr-1 and Dniepr-2 is well-know. Similarly, Azov battalion, 
originated from the paramilitary national socialist group founded by Andriy Biletsy that was named 
"Patriot of Ukraine" and renown for its slogans of white supremacy. 
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tions, in which six battalions commanders were elected (Aliyev 2016).43 Further-
more, volunteer battalions retained a conspicuous degree of autonomy and were in-
corporated into state forces through an extremely blurred and fragile legal process 
during the first phases of the Anti-Terrorist Operation announced on 15 April by 
President Turchynov (Aliyev 2016, p.509).44 These battalions emerged in parallel to 
state structures to which were only formally subordinated, expanding their influence 
over the state in a context of political crisis and legal chaos. In this context, they 
managed to progressively cement a significant monopoly over the use of force.  
Although the weapons acquisition processes by paramilitary battalions has 
remained neglected, the hypothesis has been advanced that supplies were sourced 
from official stashes (Prentice & Zverev 2016; Aliyev 2016; Puglisi 2015). Accord-
ing to others, these groups received arms through private channels (Gilley 2015; 
Aliyev 2016, p.509-511). In addition, paramilitary groups carried out firearms sei-
zures or recoveries during military operations and episodes of misappropriation 
highlighted the incapacity of Kyiv to establish full control over volunteers. Weapons 
acquisition by volunteer battalions seems to have occurred predominantly through 
organized top-down distribution, with politico-military leaders on top mediating 
with oligarchs or state apparatuses. 
Meanwhile in Donbass  
At the time of the capture of Slavyansk by Igor “Strelkov” Girkin’s forces 
on 12th April (2014), cities in Donbass were controlled by small local militias coop-
erating with law enforcement authorities and coordinating in councils with other 
civil defence groups (Kudelia 2016, p.221). The spiral of dissent, forceful repres-
sion, and mobilization already into motion culminated with the complete crumbling 
of law enforcement structures in Donbass, facilitating access to state armouries and 
43 Yurii Beryoza from the Dnipro 1 battalion and Andrii Teteryuk from the Mirotvorcheskii battalion 
were elected with the Narodniy Front; Semen Semenchenko from the Donbas battalion was elected 
with Samopomich party; Dmytro Yarosh from the Pravy Sektor battalion, elected with Pravy Sektor; 
and Andrii Biletsky, commander of the Azov battalion, and Serhiy Mel’nychuk, commander of the 
Aidar battalion, were independently elected. 
44 All paramilitary formations received the status of territorial self-defense units: some were placed 
under the Ministry of Defence, others under the National Guard and the Ministry of Interior and a 
few were left in a legal vacuum for approximately one year, such as the extreme right “Pravyi Sek-
tor”. 
217 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 5(1) 2019: 189-231, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v5n1p189 
stockpiles. Fragmentation of large or smaller state stockpiles became a leitmotiv of 
the insurgency, especially during the very first phases (Loiko 2014; Luhn 2014). The 
first militia battalions began to emerge as alliances of smaller units in conjunction 
with fragmentation of the state security sector (Puglisi 2015). Moreover, since the 
start of the ATO there were numerous defections from the Ukrainian Army and 
law enforcement authorities. 
Arms acquisition by militias occurred primarily through the capture of 
military stockpiles, bases, posts and checkpoints before and during hostilities as well 
as through the fragmentation of security structures. Access to weapons in consider-
able quantities was dependent on either battalions’ capacity to assault and raid a po-
sition or to network with the fragmenting security apparatus. In the meantime, sev-
eral leaders emerged in different cities in Donbass forming new battalions. As the 
prospect of a Russian Federation direct intervention faded away, the lead of military 
operations was taken by the Vostok Battalion, the Army of the South-East in Lu-
hansk, and Girkin’s militia (Luhn 2014). By the end of April, coordination between 
leaders and the recognition of Girkin as commander-in-chief of the region’s militias 
by the political leadership of the Donetsk republic signalled tendencies towards the 
integration of different armed formations into an organized structure. Finally, on 
the 24th of May, the self-proclaimed Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublika (DNR) and 
Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika (LNR) jointly declared the formation of the fed-
erative Union of Novorossiya. 
Phase III  
The consolidation of territorial control over the Donbass-Russian border 
during the first weeks of the summer 2014 was crucial for the development of the 
insurgency. The ability to obtain control of smuggling routes on the eastern border 
allowed armed formations, now under the flag of the DNR and LNR, to cope with 
a militarily unbalanced situation. In particular, control over border areas was key for 
the mobilization of manpower and allowed the DNR and LNR to expand their ar-
senals and capabilities acquiring light weapons, heavier systems, and armoured vehi-
cles. Given the similarities between weaponry in Ukrainian stockpiles and arsenals 
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of former Soviet countries and due to lack of reliable information, it is extremely 
difficult to certify Russian support in the form of weapons supplies.45 Ferguson and 
Jenzen-Jones have found that existing stockpiles were the most important source of 
weapons in insurgents’ hands, although it is very likely that pro-Russian separatist 
groups have received some level of support from one or more external parties (Fer-
guson & Jenzen-Jones 2014; Ismay 2015).46  
In August 2014 the military situation in Donbass battlefields rapidly 
changed. Forced to retreat from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk to Donetsk and Lu-
hansk, insurgent armed groups were able to respond and push back Ukrainian 
Armed forces in the areas of Ilovaisk and Debaltseve. It is interesting to note that 
by the time this happened the insurgency had assumed an organized and integrated 
structure, whereby this reaction of the DNR and LNR had been preceded by 
changes in the leadership of both armed organizations. The acceleration imprinted 
throughout the second half of 2014 was clearly mirrored in the capacity of the DNR 
and LNR leadership to consolidate and legitimize their authority, while controlling 
financial flows to the republics, restructuring the armed groups around a single 
command, and ousting independent warlords (Kudelia 2016, p. 230).  
 
Conclusions 
Having delved into the interrelations between firearms dynamics and in-
surgency, some theoretical and empirical considerations can be drawn. The analysis 
of the two case studies highlights the close connection between extreme violence 
and processes of state (trans)formation. In contexts where state capacities are 
openly challenged it emerges even more clearly how availability and control over the 
means of violence have an impact on the enforcement of authority and connected 
configurations of statehood. Control over weapons acquisition processes by armed 
45 An in-depth small-scale research on spent cartridges was conducted by C.J. Chivers in the area of 
Slovyansk, Andreyevka and Semyonovka. The journallist revealed that of the 54 rounds collected, 
only five appeared to have been manufactured after the Soviet collapse, while all of them bore 
stamps from the state owned Luhansk Cartridge, see Chivers 2014. 
46 The support included small arms, light weapons, guided light weapons, heavier weapons systems, 
and armoured vehicles. 
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non-state actors seem to influence armed political orders in different ways. For in-
stance, arms availability for ANSAs in Myanmar has been high, facilitated by re-
mote, fairly inaccessible, mountainous areas. The contiguity of ANSA’s zones of 
operation and involvement of state authorities, together with the heterogeneity of 
terrain, contributed to mould access to weapons and generated an overlapping of 
actors exercising sovereignty.47 In the South-East of the country, the control or cut-
ting down of weapons supplies by state actors after 1988 coincided with centripetal 
shifts in the control over the use of force implemented through collaborative rela-
tions and alliances between the Tatmadaw and armed groups. At the same time, in 
the north, unitary control over weapons acquisition by the UWSA was paralleled by 
the creation of a kaleidoscopic landscape of armed political orders dominated by the 
UWSA that still favours centrifugal trajectories of sovereignty and overall manages 
relations amongst members of the Northern Alliance and FPNCC. While for the 
Wa there has always been a single privileged source of weapons and the organiza-
tion has evolved unitarily and integrated, for the KNU/KNLA a relatively decen-
tralized structure corresponded to a plurality of sources and acquisition mecha-
nisms. The scaling down of Cambodian and Thai pipelines around the mid-1990s 
corresponded to progressive fragmentation of the movement and gradual co-
optation by the Tatmadaw. Similar processes apparently characterized the structur-
ing of the Donbass insurgency. The control over weapons acquisition of the first 
actors involved in hostilities evolved from accumulative to top-down processes 
mainly connected to the disaggregation of security apparatuses, capture of state 
stockpiles, and aid provided by oligarchs’ networks. In parallel, overall the insur-
gency evolved from bottom-up formations connected to local politico-business fig-
ures and enforcement agencies to militias backed by oligarchs and linked with na-
tional security apparatuses that ultimately rearticulated around the binary DNR-
LNR configuration under a single command and integrated structure. This would 
shed light and apparently confirm the general framework developed by Marsh, 
whereby mode of weapons acquisition and insurgency’s structure are related.  In 
47 Interviews with two anonymous informants, October 2018. 
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addition though, it should be noted how arms acquisition and control represents a 
dimension of, and thus impacts on, the constitution and distribution of authority. 
Another interesting line of analysis emerging from both cases concerns the interac-
tions between ANSAs and decentralised branches of the state which impacted arms 
acquisition. A point that in turn highlights the fallacy of monolithic conceptions of 
the state as conflict actor and the mutually constitutive character of armed actors 
relations. 
Conceptually speaking, these insights essentially question the lines dividing 
studies on arms issues and research on civil war, calling for a reciprocal integration 
of two spheres that have traditionally developed along parallel tracks as well as an 
understanding of weapons-related processes as integral dimensions of conflict. In 
this regard, the article advances existing frameworks investigating the organizational 
structure of armed non-state actors. Until now, research in this ambit has delved 
into groups’ command profile, financial architecture, and social networks (McQuinn 
2015; Staniland 2012) leaving aside a further dimension: meaning how armed 
groups organize control over arms acquisition. In parallel, part I attempted to con-
tribute theoretically to the literature on rebel governance by framing arms control as 
a further activity in which insurgents engage. Spotlighting the role of non-state ac-
tors in controlling arms opens room for delving into issues such as relations be-
tween communities and ANSAs with regard to arms and armed violence control in 
conflict and post-conflict contexts, or the practices, norms, and symbols put in 
place by insurgents in this domain of governance. Political power, as Mao Zedong 
sustained, grows out of the barrel of a gun (Mao 1963): in this sense my account is 
one that ultimately strived to emphasise weapons and related processes as physi-
cal/material aspects that have a mutual impact on socio-political trajectories of con-
flict. 
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